

XIV – PATROL BUREAU

This chapter presents study findings and recommendations relating to the operations and management of the Patrol Bureau. This discussion is divided into five sections. Background information on the Patrol Bureau's current organization, management and operations is presented first. Next, an overall assessment of the performance of the patrol division is presented. Recommendations for modifying the organization and management of the bureau and its operations divisions are presented in the third section. Opportunities to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness the patrol divisions are presented next. The implications of these recommendations for staffing and scheduling are presented in a final section.

A – BACKGROUND

The Patrol Bureau, which is led by an assistant chief, is comprised of six operating divisions each of which is responsible for providing patrol and selected investigative services to specific geographic areas of the city:

- Central Operations Division
- North Central Operations Division
- Northwest Operations Division
- Northeast Operations Division
- Southeast Operations Division
- Southwest Operations Division

In addition, to these major divisions the bureau is also responsible for coordinating field training and for overseeing compliance with the Walker consent decree.

Each of the six operations divisions is led by a deputy chief and operates out of a substation located in its area of geographic responsibility. In general, all the divisions include the following units: an administrative team; first, second and third watch patrol operations; an investigative unit, and an interactive community policing (ICP) team. However, each of the divisions also has additional units and squads based on the needs of area of the city they serve. For example, some divisions have storefront operations which are required under the terms of the Walker consent decree. In addition, the Central Operations Division has a separate unit serving the central business district.

All but one of the divisions assigns staff to work five days a week for eight hours a day. The Central Operations Divisions, however, deploys its patrol staff using a four day a week ten hour schedule. A discussion of the roles, responsibilities, location, and staffing of each of the operations divisions as well as the two support groups follows.

Central Operations Division

The smallest of the patrol operations divisions, the Central Operations Division covers a geographic area of 13.77 square miles in the heart of the city. The area it serves includes the downtown central business district (CBD) and also extends to neighborhoods immediately north of downtown (Uptown and Oak Lawn); east of downtown (Deep Ellum and Old East Dallas); south of downtown (The Cedars) and west of downtown to Stemmons Freeway. Central Operations is home to over 93,000 residents. That number swells each business day as thousands of commuters from all over the Metroplex arrive for work in the CBD. The division's substation is located at 334 South Hall Street near the intersection of Hall and Canton Street on the east side of downtown.

The division is subdivided into 31 patrol beats of varying sizes. Division staffing, by watch, is summarized in the following table.

Position	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch	CBD		Total
				Second Watch	Third Watch	
Deputy Chief		1				1
Lieutenant	1	3	1	1		6
Sergeant	5	16	6	5	4	36
Patrol	35	40	47	34	28	184
Dallas Housing Authority/NAC	1	14	1			16
Special Assignment		15				15
Investigations		15				15
ICP/Deployment/Other	3	20		1		24
<i>Total Sworn</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>109</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>297</i>
Public Safety Officer		1	2			3
Other Nonsworn	1	10	1			12
<i>Total Nonsworn</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>3</i>			<i>15</i>
Total	46	120	58	41	32	312

North Central Operations Division

The North Central Operations Division covers a geographic area of 45.66 square miles. Approximately 230,000 residents live in the area served by the division. This geographic area has experienced a 30 percent increase in population in the decade from 1990 to 2000. The division is bordered on all sides by neighboring cities: Richardson to the east; Plano to the north; Carrollton, Farmers Branch, and Addison to the west; and University Park (Park Cities) immediately to the south (between the Central Operations Division and the North Central Operations Division). Although most of the division is in Dallas County, the very northernmost area of the division (north of McCallum Boulevard) is in Collin and Denton Counties. The North Central Operations Division substation is located at 6969 McCallum Boulevard – the northeast corner of Hillcrest Road and McCallum Boulevard.

The division includes 33 patrol beats, which are primarily residential in nature. Division staffing, by watch, is summarized in the following table.

	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch	Total
Deputy Chief		1		1
Lieutenant	1	3	1	5
Sergeant	6	12	8	26
Patrol	37	44	53	134
Special Assignment		1		1
Investigations		13		13
ICP/Deployment/Other	6	16		22
<i>Total Sworn</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>202</i>
Public Safety Officer	1			1
Other Nonsworn	1	1		2
<i>Total Nonsworn</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>3</i>
Total	52	91	62	205

Northwest Operations Division

The Northwest Operations Division covers a geographic area of 46.6 square miles that includes the world trade center, the market center, the design district, the industrial district, Infomart, the Asian trade district and more than 75 hotel properties along the Stemmons Freeway Corridor. The division rivals the Central Operations Division in terms of the number of major destination commercial and business properties being served. In addition, approximately 270,000 residents live in the area served by the division. Its substation is located at 9801 Harry Hines Boulevard, on southbound Harry Hines just south of Loop 12/Northwest Highway.

The division is made up of 36 patrol beats that encompass a wide variety of residential, commercial and industrial properties. Division staffing, by watch, is summarized in the following table.

	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch	Total
Deputy Chief		1		1
Lieutenant	1	3	1	5
Sergeant	6	15	6	27
Patrol	51	48	74	173
Dallas Housing Authority/NAC		15	6	21
Special Assignment		16		16
Investigations		15		15
ICP/Deployment/Other		16		16
<i>Total Sworn</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>129</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>274</i>
Public Safety Officer		2		2
Other Nonsworn	1	7		8
<i>Total Nonsworn</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>9</i>		<i>10</i>
Total	59	138	87	284

Northeast Operations Division

The Northeast Operations Division covers a geographic area of 85.3 square miles. It is generally bordered by US75/Central Expressway on the west and extends eastward to the city limits of Richardson, Garland, and Mesquite. Approximately 350,000 residents live within this patrol division, which includes a high density of multi-family properties such as apartments, condominiums and town-homes. The division also includes a large portion of the White Rock Lake greenbelt and park which includes over 1000 acres of city-owned parkland. The division's substation is located at 9915 E. Northwest Highway, in the immediate vicinity of White Rock Lake, east of the intersection of Northwest Highway and Audelia Road.

The division is made up of 37 patrol beats. Division staffing, by watch, is summarized in the following table.

	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch	Total
Deputy Chief		1		1
Lieutenant	1	4	1	6
Sergeant	6	13	8	27
Patrol	68	71	94	233
Special Assignment	1	2	1	4
Investigations		17		17
ICP/Deployment/Other		37		37
<i>Total Sworn</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>145</i>	<i>104</i>	<i>325</i>
Public Safety Officer	1	3	1	5
Other Nonsworn	1	3	1	5
<i>Total Nonsworn</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>10</i>
Total	78	151	106	335

Southeast Operations Division

The Southeast Operations Division is geographically the largest of the department's six patrol divisions, covering approximately 92 square miles. The division is comprised of three distinct geographic areas: Pleasant Grove, East Oak Cliff, and South Dallas. It is generally bordered by Interstate 30 (R.L. Thornton Freeway) to the north; the city limits of Mesquite and Balch Springs to the east; and Seagoville, Hutchins, Lancaster and unincorporated Dallas County to the south.

This patrol division has the greatest portion of rural and undeveloped land in the city. While the division's population is estimated to be 200,000, its residential density is far less than in neighboring patrol divisions. The Southeast Operations Division includes extensive open space such as the Trinity River Greenbelt, Rochester Park, and Fair Park (which includes museums, performance halls, an amphitheater, cultural facilities, and open space) and a large acreage of city-owned parkland both developed for recreation and undeveloped. The division's substation is located at 725 North Jim Miller Road, near C.F. Hawn Freeway (also known as State Highway 175).

The division is divided into 48 patrol beats of varying size and character. Division staffing, by watch, is summarized in the following table.

	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch	Total
Deputy Chief		1		1
Lieutenant	1	2	1	4
Sergeant	10	16	12	38
Patrol	74	79	116	269
Dallas Housing Authority	2	28	2	32
Special Assignment	3	28	4	35
Investigations		17		17
ICP/Deployment/Other		24		24
<i>Total Sworn</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>195</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>420</i>
Public Safety Officer	1	1		2
Other Nonsworn	1	7	1	9
<i>Total Nonsworn</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>11</i>
Total	92	203	136	431

Southwest Operations Division

The Southwest Operations Division is the second largest of the six patrol operations, covering a geographic area of approximately 87.1 square miles. The northern and easternmost areas of the division, just across the Trinity River from the Central Business District includes the North Oak Cliff and the Kessler Park areas. These areas are considered by many to be some of the oldest and most historic neighborhoods in Dallas. The area of the Southwest Operations Division that is west of Loop 12/Walton Walker Freeway is distinctly different from these areas. These areas are largely undeveloped open space bordering Mountain Creek Lake and nearby Joe Pool Lake, or are comprised of relatively new residential development. The Southwest Operations Division also includes the Dallas Zoo, Mountain Creek Lake, and numerous historic city parks particularly in the North Oak Cliff area. Approximately 250,000 residents live within the area served by the division. The division's substation is located at 4230 West Illinois Avenue, immediately east of Cockrell Hill Road.

The division is divided into 48 patrol beats. Division staffing, by watch, is summarized in the following table.

	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch	Total
Deputy Chief		1		1
Lieutenant	1	2	1	4
Sergeant	6	13	9	28
Patrol	59	80	86	225
Dallas Housing Authority/NAC		6		6
Special Assignment		25		25
Investigations		18		18
ICP/Deployment/Other		20		20
<i>Total Sworn</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>165</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>327</i>
Public Safety Officer	1	1	1	3
Other Nonsworn		9		9
<i>Total Nonsworn</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>12</i>
Total	67	175	97	339

B – LEVEL OF SERVICE

Overall, The Level Of Service Provided By The Patrol Bureau Is Not High

The patrol operations divisions that comprise the Patrol Bureau have three primary responsibilities – they respond to calls-for-service, they conduct follow-up investigations of selected crimes; and they work to develop and implement strategies to control crime. As discussed in Chapter V, improvement is needed in each of these areas.

Calls-for-service response. On a positive note, respondents to the citizen survey are generally satisfied with the speed with which the department responds to calls-for-service. 86.3 percent of citizens are satisfied or very satisfied with the speed to which emergency calls are responded while 65.6 percent are satisfied or very satisfied with the speed with which non-emergency calls are responded. The perspectives of the citizens attending the focus groups and drop-in sessions conducted as part of this engagement were, however, quite different. Participants in these meetings were consistently vocal in expressing their concerns that response times are much too slow. This difference in perspectives may result from the fact that the citizen survey captures the viewpoints of the overall citizenry (only 20.3 percent of which had had direct interaction with the police department in the prior year) versus the actual experiences of citizens who attended the drop in sessions.

The performance of other police departments provides a context for the concerns about employee response time voiced during focus groups and drop in sessions. As the following table shows, the department’s performance with regard to response time to

calls-for-service is the second lowest among the nine benchmark police departments providing information for this study and the third lowest with regard to response time to non-emergency calls-for-service.¹

Police Department	Average Response Time To Emergency Calls-For-Service (Minutes)	Average Response Time To Non-Emergency Calls-For-Service (Minutes)
Dallas	8.5	30.0
Austin	7.4	13.4
Fort Worth	7.3	26.1
Houston	6.5	20.9
Los Angeles	10.5	65.2
Mesa	3.7	27.8
Phoenix	5.2	33.3
San Antonio	4.8	15.4
San Jose	5.5	8.1

However the passionate dissatisfaction with response times that some citizens expressed in focus groups and drop-in sessions is better understood when a frequency distribution of response times is conducted. As the following table shows, a focus on the department’s average response time masks the fact that response to some calls-for service is extremely long. In particular, response to Priority 3 and Priority 4 calls can be quite lengthy. It currently takes the police department more than 30 minutes to respond to 26 percent of the Priority 3 calls received and 46.7 percent of the Priority 4 calls received.

	In Progress	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3	Priority 4
5 Minutes Or Less	33.0%	63.4%	12.0%	8.7%	4.7%
5 Minutes To 15 Minutes	55.3%	33.3%	46.0%	37.3%	24.1%
15 Minutes To 30 Minutes	10.5%	2.5%	28.4%	28.0%	24.5%
30 Minutes To 60 Minutes	1.1%	0.4%	10.6%	16.0%	20.4%
60 Minutes Or More	0.1%	0.4%	3.0%	10.0%	26.3%

In addition, while the preponderance of respondents to the citizen survey are satisfied with the department’s response to calls, the performance of the patrol divisions falls well short of the response times citizens responding to the survey consider to be reasonable. Exhibit XIV-1 compares the department’s current performance in responding to selected

¹ Please note that these comparisons should be considered to be representative only. Benchmark police departments were asked to provide information on their average response times to emergency and non-emergency calls for service. An analysis of how these response times were calculated was not performed.

types of calls with citizen expectations as reflected in the citizen survey results. As this exhibit shows, the department's performance falls short of expectations of what citizens believe to be a reasonable response time.

Crime solution. The performance of the patrol operations division in solving crimes, when viewed on a comparative basis, is much better than its performance in responding to calls-for-service. For the two types of Part I crimes investigated by patrol operations division investigators (burglary and larceny/theft) the department exceeds the performance of all but two of the benchmark police departments with regard to burglary clearances and has the best performance with regard to the solution of larceny/thefts.

Police Department	Burglary Clearance Rate	Larceny/Theft Clearance Rate
Dallas	8.8%	19.7%
Austin	8.5%	10.1%
Baltimore	16.9%	11.4%
Fort Worth	4.9%	14.0%
Houston	7.0%	13.9%
Mesa	5.9%	15.2%
Philadelphia	14.8%	15.4%
Phoenix	5.3%	14.4%
San Antonio	5.2%	13.0%
San Jose	5.8%	19.0%

While this level of performance is commendable it is certainly reasonable to expect the department to be able to improve its clearance rate for burglaries.

Level of crime. The level of crime in Dallas, based on the number of crimes per thousand population is higher than in the benchmark cities. Violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) per thousand population are higher in Dallas than in all but one of the benchmark cities. Non-violent crimes (burglary, larceny/theft and vehicle theft) are higher in Dallas than in any of the benchmark cities.

Police Department	Violent Crimes Per 1,000 Population	Non-Violent Crimes Per 1,000 Population
Dallas	13.93	80.94
Austin	4.77	63.82
Baltimore	17.65	53.50
Fort Worth	6.74	67.41
Houston	11.99	59.98
Los Angeles	12.63	35.00
Mesa	5.33	57.23
Philadelphia	13.75	41.64
Phoenix	6.62	66.56
San Antonio	5.66	64.83
San Jose	3.65	22.40

A Number Of Issues Need To Be Addressed To Improve Patrol Bureau Performance

A number of factors relating to organization and management, deployment and scheduling practices, supervision and staffing need to be addressed to improve the performance of the patrol bureau. These issues are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

C – ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

This discussion focuses on the organization and management of the patrol operations divisions. The discussion begins by presenting an analysis of the extent to which specialization is needed within the patrol operations divisions. The next subsection then presents a discussion of the roles and responsibilities of key managers within the divisions. A model organizational structure for each patrol operations division is then presented which is followed by a discussion of the timing with which these recommendations should be implemented.

SPECIALIZATION

A Number Of Operational And Cultural Problems Are Created When Roles And Responsibilities Are Too Narrowly Defined

In general, police departments should avoid assigning roles and responsibilities of functions too narrowly unless there is an operational need to do so. From an operational perspective, defining responsibilities too narrowly limits flexibility. A resource that is dedicated to performing one task and one task only is, by definition, not available to perform other tasks. While there are ways to manage around this problem (e.g., requiring these personnel to perform non-specialized tasks when they are not needed to

perform specialized responsibilities) doing so requires management attention that might be better focused on other activities. In addition, if the need for a specialized function or service is seasonal or intermittent, calibrating capacity with need becomes very difficult when the function is assigned to a specialized unit.² The unit may be unable to meet service needs during periods of peak activity or may be overstaffed, relative to need, at other times.

Excessive specialization also creates cultural problems. When a specialized unit has been designated to perform a task, other personnel may choose not to perform it even if they could easily do so. The thinking runs, “we have a specialized group to perform this task so why should I bother with it.” This “it’s not my job” mentality is an almost unavoidable byproduct of specialization and is very difficult to manage. Indeed, this mentality is prevalent among patrol officers who answer calls. They tend not to get out of their patrol vehicles to informally talk to citizens in part because their call workload is high; but also in part because there is a perception that that’s the job of Interactive Community Police Unit officers. An even greater problem associated with excessive specialization is that it causes officers to limit their own thinking about what they can and should do while on the job. Dallas Police Department patrol officers, for example, tend to consider themselves to be little more than “call answerers” and report takers because specialized functions currently exist to perform other functions.

Roles And Responsibilities For Many Functions Are Too Narrowly Defined

Given the operational and cultural consequences of assigning responsibility for functions to specialized personnel and units when specialization is not necessary, conducting a systematic analysis to identify the functions and services for which specialization is warranted is a worthwhile endeavor. The Dallas Police Department, however, has not conducted this sort of analysis. Instead, the current configuration of specialized and non-specialized functions appears to have evolved with the emphasis on specialization increasing over time. To address this issue, a systematic analysis of the need for specialization was conducted as part of this engagement.

As a first step criteria were developed that were used to assess the extent to which specialized staff and/or a specialized unit should be assigned responsibility for performing a given function. These criteria, which are summarized in Exhibit XIV-2, include the extent to which:

- Specialized training or expertise is needed to perform the activity
- Specialized equipment or vehicles are required to perform the activity
- Performing the specialized activity would prevent a patrol officer from carrying out his or her other duties (e.g., responding to calls-for-service)

² During drop-in sessions individuals representing some of the city’s entertainment districts indicated that while they need a significant police presence on a year-round basis their needs for police visibility increase significantly during the summer months.

- The workload justifies assigning one or more person to this duty
- Forming a specialized unit reduces costs or improves the quality of services the citizens of Dallas receive

These criteria were then used to systematically evaluate each function and service performed that will be assigned to patrol operations divisions.³

As the analysis presented in Exhibit XIV-3 shows there are only five functions that should be assigned to staff working in specialized units.

- Accident investigation and response to injury accidents⁴
- Budget development and administration
- Crime analysis
- Follow-up investigations
- Grants

Other functions, by contrast, should be assigned to specialized staff on an as needed basis. When staff assigned to these functions do not need to be deployed as specialists they should be deployed as generalist patrol officers. Functions for which “as needed” specialized deployment is warranted include:

- Community education
- Proactive investigations and initiatives
- Traffic enforcement

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Roles And Responsibilities Of Key Managers Within Patrol Operations Divisions Should Be Modified To Facilitate Implementation Of The Proposed Management Framework

As discussed in Chapter VI, the recommended management framework for the police department has at its core four key elements:

- Providing authority commensurate with performance

³ Functions assigned to centralized units are, by definition, specialized so analyzing whether or not these functions should be specialized is unnecessary.

⁴ The analysis presented in Chapter VII suggests that responsibility for investigating injury accidents should be decentralized to the patrol operations divisions.

- Ensuring accountability
- Promoting collaboration and teamwork
- Leveraging scarce resources

These elements should not only define the relationship between the department's headquarters and each of its bureaus and divisions but should also define roles and responsibilities within each bureau and division as well. From the perspective of the patrol operations divisions, the roles and responsibilities for some managers will need to be modified while the roles and responsibilities of other managers will need to be fundamentally changed if the recommended framework is to be successfully implemented.

Deputy chief. Within the management framework recommended for the Dallas Police Department, the deputy chiefs who lead patrol divisions will be held accountable for the performance of their patrol divisions. Both short-term and long-term quantifiable goals and objectives consistent with the department's overall goals and objectives (discussed in Chapter V) will be established for each division and the determination of whether deputy chiefs will be allowed to continue in their roles will depend on their success in achieving these objectives.⁵ As discussed in Chapter VI, if deputy chiefs are to be held strictly accountable for the performance of their units they must also be granted the authority to have a substantive impact on the performance of their division. To this end, when the recommended management framework has been fully implemented, the deputy chiefs who lead patrol divisions should play the following key roles.

- **Leader.** Just as the Chief of Police must be the department's visible leader both internally and to the external community, the deputy chiefs who lead patrol operations divisions should be the division's visible leader both internally and to the local community. In this role the deputy chief should reinforce the department's visions and priorities (as reflected in its strategic and operational plans) to both internal and external stakeholders.
- **Entrepreneur.** The department should establish the expectation that the deputy chiefs who lead patrol operations divisions be creative in how they use the resources they have been allocated to achieve department goals and to tailor services to best meet the needs of the communities their divisions serve. The *quid pro quo* for granting division commanders greater authority over how these resources are used is the expectation that forceful attention will be focused on ensuring that these resources are used as effectively as possible. Needless to say, however, the "entrepreneurial" strategies developed by individual patrol divisions must be consistent with overall expectations for how business is to be conducted within the police department.

⁵ As discussed in Chapter VI, all deputy chiefs may not yet have developed the skills and expertise needed to fulfill the role anticipated for them by the recommended management framework. A key role of the Planning, Budget and Accountability unit described in Chapter VII is to help the deputy chiefs develop those skills. If after a reasonable period of time, however, deputy chiefs have not developed requisite skills they should be removed from their positions.

- **Planner.** While the deputy chiefs who lead patrol divisions should not be responsible for developing the operational plans (discussed in Chapter V) that will guide their divisions, they should be actively involved in developing ideas that will be incorporated into the plans and for reviewing the final product. As discussed in Chapter VI, a key determinant of the authority that will be granted to individual deputy chiefs will be the quality of the operational plans that are developed for their divisions and each deputy chief's success in implementing the tactics incorporated into these plans to achieve desired results. These operational plans will also form the basis for determining what budgetary resources should be assigned to each division.
- **Distributor of discretionary resources.** As discussed in the preceding section, when the recommended structure is implemented, instead of organizing staff into specialized units with discrete responsibilities, significant staff resources will be assigned to a discretionary pool of resources that can be used for a variety of tasks. A key role of the division's deputy chief will be to determine how best to deploy these staff to achieve department objectives.
- **Enforcer.** Just as in the recommended structure deputy chiefs should be held strictly accountable for the performance of their divisions, in the same way, patrol division lieutenants should be held strictly accountable by the division commander for the performance of their units. Lieutenants who are not able to meet performance expectations – after receiving appropriate assistance and counseling – should be dismissed or reduced in grade.
- **Staff developer.** While the deputy chiefs should be willing to dismiss and reduce in grade lieutenants who consistently do not meet performance expectations their goal should be to develop the skills of lieutenants who are struggling so that they will be able to achieve performance expectations in the future. Just as line supervisors should serve as mentors and coaches for patrol officers, deputy chiefs should serve as mentors and coaches to the lieutenants who report to them.
- **Quality reviewer.** The deputy chiefs who lead patrol divisions are ultimately responsible for the quality of service the division provides to the local community. Recommended surveys of representative citizens as well as of citizens who have had direct interactions with the police department (discussed in Chapter V) will provide quantitative feedback to the deputy chiefs on these issues. In addition, however, the deputy chiefs should also conduct “spot checks” of the quality of work performed by division staff by reviewing incident reports, investigative filings, and perhaps, most importantly by responding to calls with officers from time to time and directly observing the quality of their work.⁶

⁶ Care should be taken when conducting these “spot checks” not to undermine the authority of line supervisors. Deputy chiefs should typically just observe operations and review the quality of work performed when performing this quality assurance activity. If problems are identified those problems should be reported to the appropriate lieutenant who should work through the chain of command to address them.

- **Coordinator.** As discussed in Chapter VI, there is an inherent tension between the need for teamwork and collaboration within an organization and the need to hold managers strictly accountable for their performance. (As accountability increases managers are more likely to compete vigorously for the resources needed to ensure their success.) A key role of division commanders in the recommended structure therefore is to manage these tensions and to ensure that while promoting positive competition among subordinates, key division managers continue to work collaboratively to achieve common goals and to ensure citizens receive high quality services.

Area lieutenant. There is an inherent inconsistency in the discussion of “community policing” in many police departments. Patrol officers are expected to solve problems and to get to know the needs of the local community; however, these officers are assigned to work a single patrol shift each day. Consequently, despite the rhetoric and exhortations of department leaders, most of these officers view their job from the perspective of a single shift and it is very difficult for them to consider issues from a broader perspective.⁷

An effective way to resolve the tension between the “time of day” perspective of most patrol officers and the “geographic” perspective needed to solve problems and reduce crime is to accept the fact that patrol officers and their supervisors will typically view the work from a shift perspective. They will assign responsibility for formulating plans and strategies to addressing problems from a geographic perspective to a higher level within the organization. In the recommended structure, therefore, patrol lieutenants are assigned responsibility for developing (with the support of the sergeants and the officers who work for them) plans and strategies for solving local problems and achieving department goals (relating to both crime reduction and response time) on a geographic basis. Just as in the recommended structure deputy chiefs will be held strictly accountable by the Patrol Bureau assistant chief for the performance of their divisions, in the same way, lieutenants should be held strictly accountable by their deputy chiefs for achieving goals and objectives relating to specific geographic areas for which these lieutenants are responsible.⁸ To this end, when the recommended management framework has been fully implemented, area lieutenants within patrol divisions should function with the following roles:

- **Manager.** The primary role of patrol lieutenants will be to manage the resources allocated to them to achieve quantifiable goals – consistent with division and department goals – for the geographic areas to which they are assigned. To

⁷ Every department, of course, has officers who are exceptions to this general observation and are able to effectively play the “community policing” role established for them.

⁸ Discussions with some department managers suggest that an “area lieutenant” was previously tried unsuccessfully in the department. While details on how this concept was implemented were not available, it would not be surprising that any such management concept would not be successful in the department’s current context. Accountability is crucially important to the successful implementation of the area lieutenant concept and without accountability efforts to implement the concept are not likely to be successful.

effectively fill this role, these lieutenants will need to work a flexible schedule and will need to vary their hours to create a visible presence and to monitor activities on all patrol shifts.

- **Tactician.** Patrol lieutenants will be responsible for developing patrol deployment and crime reduction strategies for their geographic areas that will optimize performance against goals given available resources. In particular, patrol lieutenants will be responsible for developing tactical plans for the use and deployment of the resources under their command. As discussed in Chapter V, these tactical plans should articulate the problem being addressed, the information used to understand the problem, the specific tactics that will be employed to address the problem, the resources that are needed to implement the tactics, the results that are expected to be achieved, and the time frame over which the results will be achieved. It should be noted that division commanders will use these plans to help determine how discretionary resources should be allocated among competing needs within the division. As a result, these plans will play an important resource allocation as well as a planning function.
- **Community representative.** To understand the specific needs of the geographic areas for which they are responsible, lieutenants should also serve as department liaisons to the local community. It should be noted that the lieutenants need not be the only staff who perform this function – other staff can be deployed to assist – but community members should be able to clearly associate the police services provided in their local area with the lieutenant who manages those services on their behalf.
- **Staff developer.** In the recommended structure, successful implementation of tactical plans to improve service against articulated goals will depend largely on the efforts of the line supervisors who are assigned to each watch. A key role of lieutenants in this structure, therefore, is to coach and mentor these supervisors to ensure that they can effectively fulfill their important roles.
- **Quality reviewer.** As with the deputy chiefs, lieutenants should be conducting “spot checks” of the quality of work performed by the officers under their command by reviewing incident reports and observing the work of officers responding to calls.⁹

Each Division Should Establish A Small Planning, Budget And Accountability Unit To Facilitate Implementation Of The Proposed Management Framework

To facilitate implementation of the recommended management framework, each patrol division should establish a Planning, Budget and Accountability Unit whose responsibilities should mirror those of the recommended Planning, Budget and Accountability Division reporting to the Chief of Police. This unit should have the following responsibilities:

- Working with the division’s deputy chief to develop the division’s operational plan

⁹ As with the deputy chiefs, care should be taken when lieutenants conduct these “spot checks” to avoid undermining the authority of patrol sergeants.

- Developing a division budget consistent with division and department operating priorities
- Monitoring division spending and keeping the deputy chief informed about expenditures against budget
- Accessing research on best practices developed by the headquarters Planning, Budget and Accountability Division and disseminating this information to managers, supervisors and staff throughout the division
- Analyzing crime on both a division level and for each geographic area for which a lieutenant is responsible
- Establishing specific goals and objectives for each geographic area for which a lieutenant is responsible
- Monitoring performance against these goals and objectives and ensuring lieutenants receive regular feedback on performance
- Reviewing tactical plans developed by lieutenants and monitoring performance against those plans
- Providing technical assistance to lieutenants who struggle to achieve performance targets
- Pursuing grants – consistent with department priorities – that do not conflict with departmentwide grant development efforts
- Facilitating the implementation of new technology within the department

This division should be led by a lieutenant¹⁰ and should be staffed with two or three civilian analysts depending on the size of the division.

ORGANIZATION

The Organization Of Patrol Operations Divisions Should Be Modified

To implement the recommended management framework the organization of patrol operations divisions should be revised. As Exhibit XIV-4 shows, the division should be divided into four types of units:

- Planning, Budget and Accountability
- Administrative Services

¹⁰ A lieutenant is needed to lead this group because one of the unit's key roles is to provide technical assistance to other lieutenants. A civilian or a lower ranking sworn officer would lack the credibility needed to effectively fulfill this role.

- Specialized Services
- Area Services

The following paragraphs briefly discuss the roles of each of these units.

Planning, Budget and Accountability. As discussed in the last section, this unit should be responsible for developing operational plans for the division, developing budgets consistent with those plans, overseeing budget administration during the year, crime analysis, accountability (including providing technical assistance to area services lieutenants), pursuing grants and facilitating technology implementation. This unit should be led by a lieutenant.

Administrative Services. The Administrative Services Unit should be responsible for coordinating all administrative activities for the division including those performed on individual watches. In addition, the unit should be responsible for coordinating the field training function (currently a primarily administrative activity) and for providing community outreach support for the division.¹¹ This unit should be managed by a sergeant.

Specialized services. The Specialized Services Unit should include all functions decentralized to the division for which specialized staff is needed. These functions include follow-up investigations and response to injury accidents. In addition, the lieutenant who leads this unit should work with the area services lieutenants to coordinate traffic enforcement activities for the division. The specialized staff who respond to injury accidents should focus on selective traffic enforcement when they are not responding to accidents.

Area services. The area services units, each of which should be managed by a lieutenant, should be responsible for the level and quality of service provided in specific geographic areas of the division. Each unit should have its resources divided into two groups – patrol and deployment. Patrol group staff would have as their primary responsibility meeting expectations for calls-for-service response although between calls they would be expected to support proactive initiatives (defined by the area's tactical plans). In addition, area services lieutenants should have at their disposal a deployment unit that they can use at their discretion to address specific crime problems. These staff might be deployed in marked patrol elements, in unmarked vehicles, on bikes or on foot as needed to support these proactive initiatives.

¹¹ Given the significant roles outlined for the deputy chief he or she will need assistance in reaching out to community groups.

IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation Of The Revised Organizational Structure Should Be Timed To Coincide With The Implementation Of The Recommended Accountability System

The success of the proposed organizational framework for the patrol operations divisions depends on a system already having been developed to hold deputy chiefs and lieutenants accountable for the performance of the units they supervise. Without the positive pressure created by such an accountability system, area services lieutenants, for example, may not have a consistent incentive to vary their work hours so that they can monitor the implementation of service improvement and crime reduction strategies on all shifts. In addition, making effective use of the discretionary resources assigned to each area will depend, in large part, on having clearly defined expectations for performance. Moreover, unless the system of supports that is an integral part of the accountability framework envisioned in this report has been established, deputy chiefs and lieutenants who struggle to make the transition to the new approach to management will not receive the technical assistance they need to become successful.

D – ENSURING EFFICIENT OPERATIONS

This section presents opportunities for the patrol bureau and its operational divisions to make more efficient use of resources. The section is divided into five parts: deployment; scheduling; use of civilian resources; customer service; and Walker consent decree. In addition, as discussed extensively in Chapter IX, the lack of consistent supervision currently poses a significant barrier to the efficient use of patrol resources.

DEPLOYMENT

The Department's Ability To Respond Quickly To Citizen Calls For Services And To Reduce Crime Are Hampered By Existing Deployment Strategies

The ability of the patrol divisions to make the most effective use of their resources to improve response times and to reduce crime are affected by a number of deployment strategies that are not optimal. First, the current deployment of patrol staff is characterized by excessive specialization. Additionally, some staff is currently diverted from their core responsibilities to special assignments which may or may not be effective. The number of officers deployed in two-officer units is also excessive. The combination of these factors creates a situation where the patrol operations divisions fail to make the most effective use of the staff they have available.

Specialization. As discussed previously in this chapter, specialization limits the flexibility with which resources can be used. At present, however, the patrol divisions assign staff to a number of specialized units including Interactive Community Policing which focuses on community relations and community outreach activities and bike patrols. As the following table shows significant resources are devoted to these units.¹²

¹² Investigative and deployment units are not included in this analysis. As discussed previously in this chapter, assigning specialized staff to an investigative unit is appropriate. In addition, at present deployment units are used as a discretionary force to address a variety of crime issues in a division. While these staff is assigned to a specialized unit their deployment is flexible.

Division	Interactive Community Policing		Bike		Total	
	Sergeant	Police Officer Or Senior	Sergeant	Police Officer Or Senior	Sergeant	Police Officer Or Senior
		Corporal		Corporal		Corporal
Central	1	11			1	11
Northeast	1	15		2	1	17
Southeast	1	9	1	6	2	15
Southwest	1	13	0	0	1	13
Northwest	1	8		2	1	10
North	1	6			1	6
Central						
Total	6	62	1	10	7	72

While deploying these staff to patrol on bike and to perform community outreach activities when needed is certainly appropriate, assigning these staff to specialized units hinders the divisions' ability to use these resources to address emerging needs.

Details. Even patrol officers who are not assigned to specialized units but who are ostensibly responsible for responding to calls often get diverted to special details. During the four-week sample period reviewed for this engagement such special details included:

- Road rage
- Rapid Response
- Traffic
- Project Safe
- Bike detail
- Deployment detail

In addition, these officers were assigned a variety of administrative and support activities.

The patrol resources devoted to these details are not insignificant. As the following table shows over the four week sample evaluated as part of this engagement¹³ up to 22 percent of the resources available for patrol (not including officers assigned to support the Walker consent decree) were allocated to special assignments. In addition, for all but four of the 18 shifts over the six patrol divisions this percentage exceeded 10 percent.

¹³ Assignment sheets for each division were reviewed for the following weeks: January 19 to January 25, 2003; April 20 to April 26, 2003; July 20 to July 26, 2003; and November 2 to November 8, 2003.

Division	First Watch		Second Watch		Third Watch	
	Average Officers On Special Details	Percent Of Available Patrol Officers	Average Officers On Special Details	Percent Of Available Patrol Officers	Average Officers On Special Details	Percent Of Available Patrol Officers
Southeast	6.4	15.0%	9.1	19.4%	9.3	13.9%
Southwest	5.3	14.3%	12.4	22.3%	7.0	14.3%
Central	1.5	8.2%	2.3	14.5%	4.6	20.2%
North Central	2.1	11.0%	3.6	12.7%	2.5	8.2%
Northwest	2.0	6.5%	3.8	12.5%	2.0	5.1%
Northeast	5.9	15.4%	6.2	15.1%	6.3	12.7%

While these details may be worthwhile they clearly divert significant resources from a patrol function that is already having difficulty responding to calls quickly.

Two-officer elements. As discussed in Chapter IX, assigning officers to two-officer elements is expensive (except, of course, when a field training officer is assigned to the same element as a trainee.) While the cost of sending a two-officer element to a call requiring a two officer response is no more expensive than dispatching two one-officer elements, costs are roughly doubled¹⁴ when a two-officer element is deployed to a call requiring only a one officer response. This happens quite frequently because 47.6 percent of the calls received by the department require only a one officer response. In addition, even if two officers are needed as part of the initial response to an incident, if a determination is made midway through the response that only one officer is needed; an officer cannot be returned to service if both responding officers are assigned to the same element.

Despite the costs associated with deploying two-officer elements, deployment of such elements is quite common in each patrol operation division. Indeed, excluding two-element units consisting of a field training officer and a trainee, on average two-officer elements accounted for more than 10 percents of the units deployed for all but four of the 18 shifts (over the six patrol divisions) evaluated during the sample period.

¹⁴ Costs are only roughly doubled because the cost of supplying an officer with a second patrol element must be considered. However, as discussed the annualized cost of a vehicle represents only about 20 percent of the cost of a senior corporal with two years experience.

Division	First Watch		Second Watch		Third Watch	
	Average Two-Officer Elements Deployed	Percentage Of All Elements Deployed(a)	Average Two-Officer Elements Deployed	Percentage Of All Elements Deployed(a)	Average Two-Officer Elements Deployed	Percentage Of All Elements Deployed(a)
Southeast	3.9	10.6%	4.9	13.0%	14.7	19.4%
Southwest	3.3	10.4%	4.3	9.9%	8.0	14.3%
Central	2.2	13.3%	1.2	8.6%	2.4	13.4%
North Central	1.0	5.9%	3.0	12.2%	3.3	11.7%
Northwest	1.9	13.9%	2.2	8.3%	6.3	19.9%
Northeast	6.1	18.7%	4.2	12.0%	8.4	19.4%

(a) Excludes units on special details and assigned to activities associated with the Walker consent decree.

Summary. The cumulative impact of the department's deployment strategies divert significant resources from the department's ability to respond quickly to calls-for-service. In addition to the seven sergeants and 80 police officers and senior corporals assigned to specialized units, on average between 20 and 36 percent of a patrol division's capacity (excluding officers assigned to activities that support the Walker consent decree) is devoted to special details or assigned to two-officer elements.

Division	First Watch		Second Watch		Third Watch	
	Average Two-Officer/Special Detail Elements	Percentage Of All Elements Deployed(a)	Average Two-Officer/Special Detail Elements	Percentage Of All Elements Deployed(a)	Average Two-Officer/Special Detail Elements	Percentage Of All Elements Deployed(a)
Southeast	10.3	24.0%	14.1	29.8%	24.0	35.9%
Southwest	8.6	23.2%	16.6	30.0%	15.0	30.7%
Central	3.6	20.5%	3.5	21.6%	7.0	30.9%
North Central	3.1	16.3%	6.6	23.3%	5.7	19.0%
Northwest	6.4	22.4%	5.9	19.8%	12.0	32.2%
Northeast	12.0	31.2%	10.4	25.3%	14.6	29.6%

(a) Excludes units on special details and assigned to activities associated with the Walker consent decree.

The Department Should Take A Number Of Steps To Improve Its Deployment Of Patrol Resources

The department should take a number of steps to deploy its patrol resources more effectively. First, the patrol divisions should discontinue their specialized ICP and bike units. Division commanders and lieutenants may choose to continue to deploy officers to perform community outreach and to patrol on bike on an as-needed basis. However,

these decisions should be based on the tactical and operational plans developed by the divisions and assessments of how best to use resources to achieve division goals and objectives. In the same way, the department's assignment of officers to special details should be carefully examined to ensure that these deployment strategies are aligned with the division's crime reduction and service improvement strategies. Finally, the department should cease assigning officers to two-officer elements except when a field training officer is working with a trainee.

SCHEDULING

Patrol Operations Division Generally Do An Effective Job Of Scheduling Patrol Officers When They Are Most Needed

Regardless of the level of resources available to address a given workload, scheduling practices should be designed to even out the workload over the workforce. Ensuring patrol officers are scheduled to work when they are needed is not only equitable from an employee perspective – employees assigned to one shift do not have a significantly greater workload than employees assigned to another shift – but also reduces response times because backlogs of unanswered calls are minimized.

The patrol operations divisions currently do a generally effective job of scheduling patrol officers when they are needed. One measure of scheduling effectiveness is the variation (measured by the standard deviation) in workload among officers. As the following table shows, the standard deviation of calls received per officer is .25 or lower for all but the Central Operations Division and the Southwest Operations Division (although the standard deviation for the Southwest Operations Division is considerably lower than from the Central Operations Division). Indeed, the standard deviation of calls received per officer for the Central Operations Division (.43) is roughly 80 percent higher than the average for the other five patrol operations divisions (.24).

Division	Standard Deviation
Southeast	0.23
Southwest	0.31
Central	0.43
North Central	0.25
Northwest	0.19
Northeast	0.22

The primary reason for this fact is that officers assigned to the Central Operations Division work 10-hour shifts and it is much more difficult to effectively schedule officers working 10-hours per day than it is to schedule officers who work eight hour shifts. The primary reason for this is that while eight-hour shifts divide evenly into a 24-hour day, 10-hour shifts do not. Consequently, there is a two hour overlap for each 10-hour shift that is difficult to align with fluctuations in workload. As the following table shows, variations in workload per officer per hour of the day are much higher for selected hours in the Central Operations Division than they are in the other patrol divisions.

	Central	Average All Divisions	Difference
Midnight To 1:00 a.m.	0.22	0.27	(0.05)
1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.	0.26	0.24	0.02
2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m.	0.35	0.23	0.12
3:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m.	0.27	0.18	0.09
4:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m.	0.21	0.11	0.10
5:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.	0.11	0.08	0.03
6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.	0.06	0.05	0.00
7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.	0.20	0.06	0.14
8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.	0.41	0.06	0.35
9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.	0.15	0.07	0.07
10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.	0.26	0.11	0.14
11:00 a.m. to Noon	0.37	0.13	0.24
Noon to 1:00 p.m.	0.29	0.13	0.15
1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.	0.10	0.16	(0.06)
2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.	0.14	0.13	0.01
3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.	0.11	0.08	0.03
4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.	0.24	0.10	0.14
5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.	0.18	0.11	0.08
6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.	0.13	0.11	0.02
7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.	0.16	0.10	0.06
8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.	0.14	0.12	0.03
9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.	0.09	0.14	(0.05)
10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.	0.12	0.18	(0.06)
11:00 p.m. to Midnight	0.26	0.25	0.01

The Central Operations Division Should Schedule Officers To Work Eight-Hour Shifts

To improve scheduling efficiency, the Central Operations Division should cease scheduling officers to work ten-hour shifts and should schedule all officers to work eight-hour shifts. Not only will taking this step ensure a more equitable distribution of work among officers but should improve response times as well.

Patrol Work Schedules Should Begin An Hour Earlier

A challenge for any police department is to manage the call workload during shift change periods. Even if the start of shifts are staggered so that a portion of the shift begins an hour earlier than the rest of the shift considerably fewer officers will be working during the shift change hours than during the other hours of the shift. This problem is especially pronounced during the shift change from the first to the second watch and from the second to the third watch in Dallas. (The effects are mitigated during the shift change from the third to the first watch because an overlapping “power shift” is available to answer calls during these hours.)

While this problem cannot be completely avoided some steps can be taken to mitigate the impact of this problem. First, within reason, employees should be scheduled to change shifts during the hours of the day when the call workload is lowest.¹⁵ However, as the following table shows the average call workload for current shift change hours (7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. for the change from the first to second watch and 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. for the change from the second to the third watch) is greater than the call workload would be if the watches began just one hour earlier.

	First And Second Watch Shift Change (Average Calls)	Second And Third Watch Shift Change (Average Calls)
Current Schedule (a)	170	287
Recommended Schedule(b)	123	266

(a) Second watch begins at 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.; third watch begins at 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.
 (b) Second watch begins at 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.; third watch begins at 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.

In addition to beginning shifts one hour earlier the department should also consider staggering the start times of watches to begin every half hour over a two hour period. Doing so would result in only a quarter of the personnel assigned to the watch being unavailable to answer calls during the start of a watch as opposed to half of the watch being unavailable to answer calls under the current system.

USE OF CIVILIAN RESOURCES

Additional Clerical Support Should Be Provided To Support Patrol Investigative Units

The activity analysis survey conducted as part of this study reveals that investigators assigned to patrol divisions currently spend a sizable portion of their work day on administrative and paperwork related activities.¹⁶ The survey indicates that investigators devote 24.0 percent of their time to preparing offense or case related paperwork, 7.8 percent of their time preparing other paperwork, and 6.8 percent of their time answering phone calls on matters unrelated to follow-up investigations. While certainly not all of this work can be delegated to civilian support staff, investigators report that considerable administrative work could be delegated to support staff if sufficient staff were available to perform this work. At present, however, investigators have relatively few clerical staff to support them. Indeed, as the following table shows, the ratio of clerical support staff to investigators (including sergeants) in patrol divisions averages 1.2 clerks for every 17.5 investigators.

¹⁵ For the purposes of this analysis, the only shift change hours examined were between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. for the shift change from the first to the second watch and from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. for the shift change from the second to the third watch. Asking employees to begin their work shift at 5:00 a.m. or earlier was not considered reasonable and therefore was not evaluated.

¹⁶ Investigators assigned to patrol divisions were asked to complete an on-line survey in which they were asked to estimate the time they devote to various activities over the course of a year. 77 of the 95 investigators completed this survey (81.0 percent).

Division	Sergeant And Investigator	Clerical Support Staff(a)
Southeast	19.0	1.0
Southwest	20.0	2.0
Central	17.0	1.0
North Central	14.0	1.0
Northwest	16.0	1.0
Northeast	19.0	1.0
Average	17.5	1.2

(a) Includes civilian police technicians.

To address this situation, one additional clerical support personnel should be assigned to each patrol operations division with the exception of the Southwest Operations Division which already assigns two civilian support staff to its investigative unit.

CUSTOMER SERVICE

The Department Should Discontinue Its Current Practice Of Contacting All Crime Victims

The patrol operations divisions have established a policy of contacting victims of crime whether or not sufficient leads exist to make conducting a follow-up investigation worthwhile. There is little value to this practice from an investigative perspective – one investigator estimated that only in about three percent of the cases does the contact result in a new lead being identified. The department should discontinue this practice. However, there may be value in continuing to send a letter to crime victims asking them to report any additional information that may have been uncovered after the responding officer completed his or her preliminary investigation.

WALKER CONSENT DECREE

Over Time, Department Support To Citizens Who Live In Housing Authority Properties Should Be Evaluated In Terms Of The Level Of Service Provided

Due to concerns that the city was not providing adequate services to citizens who live in Dallas Housing Authority properties a consent decree was issued requiring the police department to provide specified services. While the department is no longer bound by this consent decree it has made a commitment to continuing to provide services in the manner specified by the consent decree for an additional two years.

The agreement requires the department to provide two-officer elements from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. seven days a week at the following Dallas Housing Authority sites: Turner Courts; Rhodes Terrace; Frazier Courts; Cedar Springs and Little Mexico combined; Roseland Homes and Lakewest. In addition, the department is required to provide nine police neighborhood assistance centers – each of which is to be staffed with two police officers, one caseworker and one community outreach representative.

As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, assigning officers to two-person elements is an expensive approach to providing services. In addition, storefront operations – such as the neighborhood assistance centers – while perhaps helpful years ago when police departments were struggling to establish stronger ties with the community have become

much less necessary as police departments have adopted community policing philosophies. Moreover, as previously discussed, dedicating staff to a specialized function as required by the consent decree limits the department's ability to flexibly use its resources to address emerging needs (many of which may affect citizens living in housing authority properties.)

When the terms of the current agreement expires the department should seek to affirm its commitment to providing high quality services to Dallas Housing Authority properties not by guaranteeing the level of resources to be provided but by negotiating a level of service that will be maintained. (The methodology for establishing performance measures presented in Chapter IV could serve as a starting point for these discussions.) Taking this approach would ensure that the citizens who reside in Dallas Housing Authority properties continue to receive high quality police services while freeing the department to determine the most cost-effective way to provide the services.

E – ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS

This section discusses steps the department can take to improve the effectiveness of patrol officers. The section is divided into five parts: beat responsibility, preliminary investigations; property; vehicles; equipment and call priorities.

BEAT RESPONSIBILITY

Patrol Officers Should Be Encouraged To Develop An Understanding Of The Community Needs And Policing Issues In The Patrol Beats And Sectors To Which They Are Assigned

As previously discussed, most patrol officers have a tendency to view policing issues from the perspective of the individual shift to which they have been assigned. While this perspective is, to some extent, unavoidable that does not mean that patrol officers should not also strive to develop a geographic identification with the patrol beats and sectors to which they are assigned. Indeed, to the extent possible, consistent with the crime reduction and service improvement strategies being developed by the area lieutenants, patrol officers should be assigned to the same beat and work to develop an understanding of the community needs and policing issues in that beat. Moreover, if a crime reduction or service improvement initiative is focused on an individual patrol officer's beat, he or she should be expected to take the lead in supporting those efforts. In addition, as long as call response times do not exceed expectations, every effort should be made for the officer assigned to a beat to respond to calls in that beat.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

The Department Should Reinforce The Importance Of Conducting Thorough Preliminary Investigations At Crime Scenes

For the most part, investigators currently conduct follow-up investigations of property crimes such as burglaries only if a lead is identified and included as part of the initial police report. This is an effective practice since there is little an investigator can do to solve a crime unless there is a lead he or she can investigate.¹⁷ Consequently, a key to improving the solution rate for property crimes is to uncover more leads at incident scenes by conducting thorough preliminary investigations as part of the initial response to the crime scene. In the Dallas Police Department, however, the quality of the preliminary investigations performed is quite inconsistent. Some investigators report that officers do not even correctly identify the name and address of the victim, which makes it difficult to even contact the victim, much less to follow-up on leads.

As part of an overall effort to improve the solution rate to burglaries (currently 8.8 percent) the department should reinforce the importance of conducting thorough preliminary investigations at crime scenes. As discussed in Chapter IX, a key to this effort will be to ensure that supervisors place a consistent emphasis on this activity. Giving competing imperatives to reduce patrol response times to calls-for-service supervisors will need to be careful not to create pressures on patrol officers to return to service too quickly (so they will be available to respond to calls) rather than on performing effective preliminary investigations.

PROPERTY

The Department Should Take Aggressive Steps To Ensure That Procedures For Handling Property Are Consistently Enforced

Procedures for handling property obtained by police officers are not consistently enforced in all patrol divisions. Among other problems property tags are not consistently legible and complete and the property room at some divisions is not always locked – which could result in property being stolen or tampered with. Clearly, any issue that could compromise the chain of custody for evidence is a serious problem that must be immediately addressed. The key to this effort will be ensuring that line supervisors monitor how property is handled by their subordinates.

VEHICLES

The Department Should Consider Providing Home Storage Vehicles To Officers Who Drive Marked Elements And Live Within The City Of Dallas

One of the themes that emerged from discussions with citizens at the drop-in sessions staged throughout the city as part of this engagement was the need for increased police visibility. One way to provide this visibility at a relatively modest cost to the city is to allow officers who drive marked elements and live within the City of Dallas to take their

¹⁷ In work the consultants have performed for other police departments where cases without leads were investigated, the percentage of such cases that were solved was extremely low.

vehicles home at night. Significant increased visibility will result when officers use their vehicles to drive to and from work and for approved personal business. In addition to the advantages associated with increased visibility, allowing officers who live within the city limits to take cars home would greatly increase the department's ability to quickly mobilize police officers in the event of an emergency (a benefit that has increased in value since the events of September 11, 2001).

It should be noted that these benefits can be achieved at a relatively modest cost to the city. Because take home vehicles are used less intensively than other patrol vehicles they have a much longer life. Additionally, many police departments that employ take home car programs discover that maintenance costs for these vehicles actually decline because they are taken better care of by their users than other patrol vehicles. Indeed, the primary cost associated with allowing officers to take cars home is the additional mileage these vehicles accumulate as they are driven to and from work. Assuming an average additional mileage of 6,220 miles per year¹⁸ and a cost per mile of \$0.59 the cost to the city of allowing officers to take vehicles home is \$3,669 per vehicle. Since approximately 30 percent of the department's employees currently reside in the city of Dallas, at recommended staffing levels 591 patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants would be eligible for the program. The annual additional cost associated with this "home storage" plan would be approximately \$2.17 million.¹⁹

Patrol Officers Should Be Assigned The Same Patrol Element Whenever Possible

As discussed in Chapter X, the condition of many patrol vehicles is not good. While the age and mileage of the vehicle can be partly blamed for their condition the fact remains that some officers do not take good care of the vehicles they are assigned. One way to address this issue is to assign patrol officers the same patrol element whenever possible. Doing so will create some "ownership" of the vehicle – even for officers who live outside the city limits and will not be allowed to take vehicles home – and should create an incentive for officers to take better care of them.

EQUIPMENT

Patrol Vehicles Should Be Equipped With Prisoner Shields

Patrol vehicles are currently not equipped with prisoner shields. As a result, when a person is arrested they must be restrained in the back seat of the vehicle and even then pose a potential threat to officers who are driving the patrol elements. Moreover, when a prisoner becomes ill, patrol officers in the front seat do not have a barrier between themselves and the sick prisoner.

¹⁸ This estimate is based on the average round trip from the police headquarters to the homes of 13 officers who currently take vehicles home and assumes employees report to work 208 days a year.

¹⁹ These costs would be offset by the savings associated with reducing the number officers who currently take cars home as discussed in Chapter X.

Prisoner shields are basic equipment in police departments across the country and the Dallas Police Department should be no different. Purchasing prisoner shields for each patrol element will cost an estimated \$390 each and a total cost of at least \$116,000 for the fleet of patrol elements.²⁰

Police Vehicles Should Be Equipped With Video Cameras

The department has already made a significant investment in equipping patrol vehicles with video cameras and is planning to make additional investments. In the current budget 150 video cameras are proposed and the department is planning to purchase 150 additional cameras each year for the next four years to outfit all patrol elements with cameras. Given the importance of video cameras in enhancing public trust, however, the department should explore ways to accelerate efforts to equip all patrol vehicles with video cameras. Such cameras are invaluable to protect the department from unwarranted allegations of police brutality and racial profiling while also providing department managers with the tool they need to aggressively and proactively address legitimate concerns about excessive use of force or profiling.

CALL PRIORITIES

The Call Priorities Established By The Police Department Do Not Match Citizens Perspectives With Regard To Which Calls Should Be Responded To More Quickly

The police department has established five levels of priorities for calls based on the police department's perspective relating to the speed with which various types of calls should be answered. The results of the citizen survey suggest, however, that citizen expectations for which calls are the most important do not consistently match the call priorities established by the department. As the following table shows, the department's priority for response to street robberies and home burglaries (where the perpetrator has left) is higher than the priority inferred from the citizen survey. On the other hand, the department's priority for a call where a teenager is racing down the street is lower than the priority inferred from the citizen survey. It should be noted, of course, that this discussion reflects relative priorities. As previously discussed, the department's response to many of these call types falls considerably short of citizen expectations as reflected in the citizen survey.

²⁰ At recommended staffing levels an average of 260 officers per day will be working on the third watch (the watch with the greatest number of officers). If prisoner shields are provided only for these vehicles (and a 15 percent "maintenance float") the total cost will be \$116,000. These costs will, of course, increase, if additional vehicles are equipped with prisoner shields (for example, the element used by sergeants or elements that officers are allowed to take home.)

Call	Percent Of Citizens Expecting Response In Five Minutes Or Less	Percent Of Citizens Expecting Response In 15 Minutes Or Less	Citizen Priority	Department Priority
Home burglary and burglar may still be there	99.7%	99.7%	In Progress	In Progress
Fight in neighborhood where someone has been cut	98.7%	99.0%	1	1
Gun fired in neighborhood but no one hurt	92.2%	98.5%	2	2
Suspicious person loitering in neighborhood	80.2%	98.5%	3	3
Teenager racing car up and down street	77.7%	96.5%	3	4
Street robbery and robber has left	76.9%	95.5%	3	2
Home burglary and burglar has left	40.9%	84.5%	4	3
Nuisance such as barking dog	23.6%	44.4%	4	4

Follow-Up Surveys Should Be Conducted To Better Understand Citizen Service Priorities Relating To Calls-For-Service

The information on citizen expectations relating to response times to calls-for-service developed as part of the citizen survey is extremely helpful in understanding overall citizen service expectations. However, the information is not as useful as it could be because citizens were not asked to make tradeoffs among different response times to calls-for-service. Consequently, the survey results could not be used to assess the relative importance to citizens of, for instance, responding quickly to nuisance calls versus burglaries where the perpetrator has left more quickly. This sort of analysis can and should be performed. Using a statistical technique known as conjoint analysis, citizens can be surveyed in such a way that the relative “utility” associated with different response time options can be assessed. Conducting such a survey, however, was beyond the scope of this engagement.

The results of this survey should be used to refine department expectations with regard to how quickly calls of various types should be answered. In particular, the department can use this information to identify types of calls for which an extremely fast response has relatively little value to citizens. In addition, this information can be used to refine the department’s understanding of how responses of varying speeds to different types of calls for service affect the overall utility of citizens. This information can then be used to tailor call response strategies to better match the level of service the department provides (given available resources) to citizen priorities.

F – STAFFING AND SCHEDULING

This section presents recommendations relating to the staffing and scheduling of the patrol operations divisions. This section is organized to correspond with each of the key organizational units in the recommended patrol structure: area services; specialized services; planning, budget and accountability; and administrative services. A final section summarizes the staffing recommendations.

AREA SERVICES

This section is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the staffing needed to respond to calls quickly while ensuring officers also have time to perform other needed work. The second part discusses the discretionary staffing needs, and the third section discusses supervisory and management staffing requirements.

Calls-For-Service Response

Analysis of the staffing needed to respond quickly to calls-for-service has a number of components:

- Evaluating alternative approaches to handling calls
- Using queuing analysis to determine the number of officers needed to ensure a high probability that an officer will be available to respond to the call when the call is received
- Ensuring officers have sufficient time to perform activities other than responding to calls for service
- Applying a relief factor to calculate the number of officers who need to be employed to ensure required staffing levels are maintained
- Assessing supervisory staffing needs

A discussion of each of these components of the analysis follows.

Evaluating alternative approaches to handling calls. Before determining how many patrol officers are needed to respond to citizen calls for service and to perform other needed activities it is first necessary to consider what calls need to be handled by patrol officers. Two alternatives to having sworn police officers respond to calls were evaluated as part of this engagement and both approaches were found to be cost effective. Analysis of staffing requirements associated with the first approach – using an expediter unit to handle some calls by phone – is presented in Chapter XVII. The second recommended alternative approach to handling calls is for civilian Public Safety Officers (PSOs) to handle selected calls that do not require the skills, training and experience of a sworn officer. Such calls include animal complaints, parking violations,

abandoned property, street blockage and minor accidents²¹. As the following table shows, the number of such calls occurring each day of the week in each patrol division is not small.

Division	Calls Per Year	Percent Of Call Workload(a)
Southeast	16,167	9.5%
Southwest	18,305	11.8%
Central	12,433	10.9%
North Central	12,581	13.6%
Northwest	16,601	14.6%
Northeast	14,812	10.2%

Assigning civilian PSOs to handle these calls will free up sworn officers to handle other calls -- that do require the skills, training and experience of a police officer -- more quickly. It should be noted, however, that PSOs will need to receive training on how to effectively handle these calls. In particular, training on how to handle minor accidents should be provided, as will training on how to deal with citizens when handling animal complaints. While the training PSOs receive will by no means be as extensive as the training of sworn officer, systematically evaluating and assessing PSO training needs will ensure that the quality of service citizens receive is not affected when this recommendation is implemented.

The number of PSOs that need to be assigned to each patrol division to handle these calls is summarized in the following table.²²

²¹ The list of calls that can be handled by PSOs was reviewed by the project steering committee.

²² This analysis assumes that it takes PSOs an average of 30 minutes to handle each call and that 15 minutes is required to travel between calls. A relief factor of 1.25 for each PSO shift was used to determine staffing needs. In addition, this analysis assumes that one PSO will be on duty in each division substation on each of the primary watches to serve as "station officer." Station officer duties include answering the phone, handling walk-in complaints, and distributing equipment. PSOs are assumed to be productive for seven hours out of their eight-hour shifts.

Division/Watch	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Total
Southeast								
First Watch			1		1		2	4
Second Watch		4			3		1	8
Third Watch		4		3			1	8
<i>Subtotal</i>		8	1	3	4		4	20
Southwest								
First Watch		1		1		2		4
Second Watch		4			1		4	9
Third Watch			1		4		4	9
<i>Subtotal</i>		5	1	1	5	2	8	22
Central								
First Watch		1		2		1		4
Second Watch		3			1		2	6
Third Watch	1		3			3		7
<i>Subtotal</i>	1	4	3	2	1	4	2	17
North Central								
First Watch				2		2		4
Second Watch	1		3		2			6
Third Watch		1			1		3	5
<i>Subtotal</i>	1	1	3	2	3	2	3	15
Northwest								
First Watch		1		2			2	5
Second Watch		4			3		1	8
Third Watch		4		3			1	8
<i>Subtotal</i>		9		5	3		4	21
Northeast								
First Watch		1		1		2		4
Second Watch		3		3			1	7
Third Watch		4			1		4	9
<i>Subtotal</i>		8		5	1	2	5	20
Total								115

Queuing analysis. The most important factor in ensuring fast response to calls-for-service is the availability of officers to respond to calls when they are received. At present, for example, of the 33.8 minutes it takes on average to respond to calls, 24.2 minutes is required to dispatch the call. Most of the delay in the time from when the call is received to when it is dispatched results because officers are not available to respond. To ensure officers are available to respond to calls when they are received, an analysis of the total calls-for-service received in 2003 was performed²³ and queuing analysis was used to determine the number of elements that need to be deployed to ensure a 95 percent probability that an element will be available to respond to a call-for-service when it is received.²⁴ The results of this analysis for each patrol operations division is presented in Exhibit XIV-5.

²³ Calls handled by the expeditor unit, by elements deployed under the terms of the Walker consent decree, and injury accident calls (which will be handled by specialized elements in the recommendation structure) were excluded from this analysis.

²⁴ When conducting this analysis calls that require a multiple unit response were appropriately weighted. In addition, the analysis assumes an average out of service time per call of 40

With the exception of the Central Operations Division, during most hours in a week there are sufficient employees currently assigned responsibility for answering calls in each patrol division for there to be a high probability that an officer will be available when a call is received. Indeed, as the following table shows, in five of the six patrol divisions sufficient officers are deployed for there to be a 95 percent probability that an officer is available for call response at least 75 percent of the hours in a week and in three of these divisions sufficient officers are deployed for there to be a 95 percent probability that an officer is available for call response more than 90 percent of the hours in a week. (The number of officers in excess or below the number needed to ensure a 95 percent probability of officer availability is summarized in Exhibit XIV-6.)

Division	Hours In Week Sufficient Officers Are Deployed To Ensure 95 Percent Availability	Percent Of Hours In Week Sufficient Officers Are Deployed To Ensure 95 Percent Availability
Southeast	152	90.5%
Southwest	126	75.0%
Central	58	34.5%
North Central	139	82.7%
Northwest	159	94.6%
Northeast	157	93.5%

However, as previously discussed, because officers who are ostensibly available to respond to calls are assigned to special details and deployed in two-officer elements the actual capacity of each patrol division to respond to calls-for-service is actually much lower.

Ensuring time spent answering calls is not excessive. If staffing levels are set solely to ensure sufficient officers are available to ensure a high probability (95 percent) that an officer will be available when a call is received officers on some watches will devote an extremely high percentage of their shifts to answering calls.

minutes. While less than the current out-of-service time with appropriate supervisions this is a reasonable expectation.

Division/Watch	Percent Of Eight Hour Shift Responding To Calls						
	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Southeast							
First Watch	65.4%	63.5%	64.8%	64.3%	64.9%	69.4%	74.5%
Second Watch	65.3%	64.9%	65.3%	65.7%	65.6%	64.7%	66.3%
Third Watch	72.4%	72.4%	72.4%	72.6%	72.0%	73.1%	74.1%
Southwest							
First Watch	63.8%	62.0%	62.4%	62.8%	63.1%	69.2%	72.6%
Second Watch	63.5%	64.2%	64.3%	64.8%	64.0%	64.1%	65.5%
Third Watch	72.1%	70.2%	70.4%	71.8%	70.6%	71.2%	72.7%
Central							
First Watch	62.4%	60.8%	60.8%	61.8%	62.3%	68.6%	70.2%
Second Watch	58.6%	60.5%	60.8%	61.1%	60.9%	60.6%	60.3%
Third Watch	65.3%	66.2%	65.9%	66.6%	66.3%	66.9%	66.5%
North Central							
First Watch	56.3%	54.9%	55.9%	57.0%	58.0%	62.2%	64.3%
Second Watch	58.2%	59.2%	59.8%	59.7%	60.4%	59.9%	59.4%
Third Watch	63.8%	64.0%	64.3%	64.3%	64.6%	64.4%	65.4%
Northwest							
First Watch	61.7%	58.1%	58.8%	60.3%	60.6%	66.9%	69.2%
Second Watch	59.2%	60.7%	59.6%	59.9%	60.2%	59.6%	61.0%
Third Watch	65.1%	64.7%	64.6%	64.6%	64.6%	66.1%	66.6%
Northeast							
First Watch	64.2%	62.7%	63.8%	63.4%	63.5%	68.8%	70.7%
Second Watch	63.4%	63.8%	64.1%	64.1%	63.9%	64.2%	64.3%
Third Watch	71.1%	70.2%	69.8%	69.9%	69.8%	70.6%	70.9%

Indeed, if staffing is based on the results of queuing analysis alone, officers in three of the patrol divisions will devote more than 70 percent of their eight-hour shift doing nothing but responding to calls during the third watch.

Division	Average Percent Of Time Devoted To Answering Calls Per Watch		
	First Watch	Second Watch	Third Watch
Southeast	66.7%	65.4%	72.7%
Southwest	65.1%	64.3%	71.3%
Central	63.8%	60.4%	66.3%
North Central	58.4%	59.5%	64.4%
Northwest	62.2%	60.0%	65.2%
Northeast	65.3%	64.0%	70.3%

Recommended staffing levels were therefore adjusted to ensure that the patrol officers on any shift will not spend more than 50 percent of their shift responding to calls. At this level of staffing officers will respond to approximately 5 calls per shift on average and will have an average of more than 42 minutes before and after each call to perform administrative activities or to participate in proactive initiatives.²⁵

²⁵ If officers respond to five calls per shift on average and each call takes an average of 45 minutes, 225 minutes per shift will be devoted to answering calls. The remaining 255 minutes per shift will be divided among six intervals (one interval before the first call, one interval after the last call, and four intervals between calls) for an average of 42.5 minutes per interval.

Linear programming was used to determine the optimal way to allocate officers among three primary watches (starting at either 6:00 a.m. or 7:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m. or 3:00 p.m.; and 10:00 p.m. or 11:00 p.m.) and a ten-hour “power shift”²⁶ (typically running from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. four days a week) to ensure that officers spend no more than 50 percent of their shift answering calls. An adjustment was then made to the linear programming calculations to ensure that sufficient officers are deployed on each shift to ensure a 95 percent probability that an officer will be available to respond whenever a call is received. The results of this analysis are presented in Exhibit XIV-7.

At the recommended staffing levels on all but three watches over the six patrol division officers will spend less than half their time responding to calls-for-service (and on these watches no more than 52.8 percent of an officer’s time will be devoted to call response.

Division/Watch	Percent Of Eight Hour Shift Responding To Calls						
	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Southeast							
First Watch	30.6%	36.5%	46.3%	37.6%	35.7%	43.0%	46.3%
Second Watch	38.8%	40.2%	41.2%	40.1%	40.6%	41.8%	39.3%
Third Watch	50.3%	41.5%	41.2%	43.3%	42.8%	42.4%	43.8%
Southwest							
First Watch	23.3%	28.1%	33.8%	45.9%	31.1%	35.8%	41.1%
Second Watch	42.9%	41.2%	41.7%	45.0%	44.9%	43.2%	42.4%
Third Watch	42.4%	46.4%	42.5%	43.0%	36.6%	37.6%	40.0%
Central							
First Watch	28.2%	34.5%	48.4%	39.0%	36.2%	47.4%	52.8%
Second Watch	38.2%	37.0%	37.4%	38.6%	40.0%	39.3%	37.8%
Third Watch	41.1%	40.6%	40.9%	44.4%	44.9%	44.1%	43.3%
North Central							
First Watch	24.4%	33.0%	40.3%	35.6%	35.6%	39.1%	38.5%
Second Watch	37.0%	36.4%	37.3%	37.1%	37.6%	38.9%	37.9%
Third Watch	52.4%	42.9%	45.3%	45.9%	44.7%	41.9%	44.2%
Northwest							
First Watch	29.4%	31.4%	46.9%	43.0%	38.5%	45.8%	46.7%
Second Watch	41.5%	41.0%	41.0%	39.4%	41.3%	43.2%	41.2%
Third Watch	52.8%	42.9%	43.4%	45.1%	43.6%	42.5%	44.2%
Northeast							
First Watch	30.4%	37.6%	47.5%	40.8%	39.0%	48.7%	43.4%
Second Watch	41.3%	40.1%	41.4%	41.6%	41.1%	40.7%	40.5%
Third Watch	45.6%	40.0%	41.8%	43.3%	40.9%	40.7%	41.7%

The recommended schedule is somewhat more efficient than the current schedules. As the following table shows, the standard deviation (or variation) in the calls answered by officer per hour under the recommended schedule is somewhat lower under the recommended than under the current schedule for each patrol division.

²⁶ A power shift is recommended to provide additional staffing capacity during the late evening and early morning hours on Friday and Saturday nights when the call workload peaks.

Division	Standard Deviation For Current Schedule	Standard Deviation For Recommended Schedule	Difference
Southeast	0.23	.16	0.07
Southwest	0.31	.19	0.12
Central	0.43	.17	0.26
North Central	0.25	.15	0.10
Northwest	0.19	.17	0.02
Northeast	0.22	.16	0.06

Relief factor. The number of staff needed on each shift must be multiplied by a relief factor to ensure that these staffing levels are maintained after accounting for vacation, holidays, sick time, training, court time and other excused absences. To determine the appropriate relief factor information on actual number of hours uniformed officers assigned to patrol were absent in from July 1, 2003 to February 13, 2004 was summed and multiplied by a factor of 1.67 to account for a full year of absences. As the following table shows, when officers are trained an average of 40 hours per year (as recommended in Chapter VIII) each officer will be absent for an average of 415.4 hours per year (excluding regularly scheduled days off).

	Hours Per Year
Vacation	147.9
Sick	88.1
Holiday Leave	87.8
Training(a)	40.0
FMLA	17.1
Court(b)	16.0
Other Leave	18.5
Total	415.4

- (a) Recommended training per year
(b) Estimated court time per year.

Since officers work 2,080 hours per year a relief factor of 1.25 is needed to cover for anticipated absences for each officer on each shift.²⁷ This relief factor is multiplied by the number of officers needed per watch to determine the total number of officers that need to be assigned to each watch.

Recommended staffing by watch for each division after taking in account relief needs is presented in Exhibit XIV-8

²⁷ 2,080 hours per year divided by the number of hours officers are expected to be on duty to work (2,080 minus 415.4 or 1,664.6) equals 1.25.

Discretionary Staffing Needs

Framework for assessing discretionary staffing needs. Analysis of the staffing needed to ensure a prompt response to citizen calls-for-service is analytically straightforward and the level of service desired can be clearly linked to the availability of patrol resources. Determining the staffing needed to undertake proactive activities such as community outreach and proactive investigations, on the other hand, is much less straightforward. As discussed in Chapter V, once an initial level of staffing has been established, assessments of whether staffing should be increased or reduced can be based on an evaluation of performance against goals and an evaluation of the likely success of the operational and tactical plans developed by the department. Since no such plans currently exist, and performance measures have not been established, there is little analytic basis for determining what level of discretionary resources are needed. The judgment and experience of the members of the consulting team was therefore relied on to determine what discretionary resources should be assigned to each patrol division.

A useful way to consider thinking about the need for discretionary resources is to consider what percentage of available capacity should be devoted to proactive activities and what percentage should be devoted to reactive activities (such as responding to citizen calls-for-service). The percent of patrol resources currently to devoted to proactive activities in each patrol division is summarized in the following table.²⁸

Division	Percent Of Resources Devoted To Proactive Activities
Southeast	27.0%
Southwest	30.0%
Central	62.4%
North Central	23.5%
Northwest	23.8%
Northeast	26.0%
Average	32.0%

Given the high level of crime in Dallas increasing the department's investment in its proactive policing activities is warranted. To this end, the department should increase its investment in proactive policing activities so that the time patrol officers spend responding to calls and the time they spend on proactive activities is roughly equal. (An additional third of their time is needed for administrative activities and breaks.)²⁹ Over time, as the level of crime is reduced, the percentage of resources devoted to proactive activities might be reduced. However, in the short term, it is not reasonable to expect

²⁸ This analysis assumes that all of a patrol officer's time that is not spent working in a specialized unit or on a special detail is "reactive." This assumption seems reasonable given that the department currently does very little to ensure that patrol officers who are primarily assigned responsibility for responding to calls-for-service make productive use of their time between calls.

²⁹ At recommended staffing levels patrol officers should spend one-third of their time responding to calls, one-third of their time on proactive activities and one-third of their time on administrative activities.

the department to be successful in its efforts to reduce crime even after management improvements are implemented unless adequate resources are available to support proactive crime reduction initiatives.

Determining the need for additional discretionary resources. The additional proactive capacity that needs to be assigned to each patrol division can be calculated by subtracting the time patrol officers currently are able to devote to proactive initiatives between calls³⁰ from the total time they are expected to devote to proactive activities (which should equal the time they currently spend responding to calls).³¹ The following table estimates, at recommended staffing levels, the number of additional officers (on a full-time equivalent basis) that are needed each day in each division so that the amount of time devoted to responding to calls and the amount of time devoted to proactive activities will be equal.

Division	FTEs Needed For Proactive Initiatives(a)	Patrol FTEs Currently Available Between Calls	Additional FTEs Needed To Support Proactive Initiatives
Southeast	86.64	35.92	50.72
Southwest	79.38	46.03	27.95
Central	58.71	26.58	32.13
North Central	45.77	24.49	21.28
Northwest	52.67	19.76	32.91
Northeast	73.98	30.99	42.99
Total	397.16	183.77	207.98

In addition, some additional proactive capacity is warranted because the time patrol officers devote to proactive initiatives between calls will, by necessity, be somewhat less productive than the time of officers who devote their full attention to proactive activities. Assuming the time patrol officers devote to proactive initiatives is one-third less productive than the time of dedicated officers an additional 61.2 FTEs of proactive capacity is needed.

Allocating discretionary resources over the patrol divisions. One way to provide the recommended increase in proactive capacity is to simply assign more officers to patrol shifts so that, on average, each officer spends one-third of his or her time responding to calls, one-third on proactive initiatives and one-third on administrative activities. However, this approach provides the same level of proactive capacity on the first watch (when it may be more difficult to use effectively) as on the second and third watches (which may be more amenable to proactive initiatives.) In addition, when proactive capacity is enhanced simply by increasing the number of patrol officers deployed the availability of area lieutenants to make effective tactical use of these proactive resources is limited.

There is some appeal, however, to establishing the expectation that one-third of a patrol officer's time should be devoted to responding to calls and an equal amount of time should be devoted to proactive initiatives. Doing so clearly communicates that all patrol

³⁰ As previously discussed, patrol officers can be assigned to any proactive activities that can be interrupted to respond to a call for service. After the call has been completed the officer can return to the proactive activity.

³¹ This analysis assumes that roughly a third of a patrol officer's time will be devoted to paperwork, breaks, roll call, and traveling to and from the substation at the beginning and end of a shift.)

officers are expected to participate in proactive initiatives and that no patrol officer should consider him or herself to be merely a “report taker.” Consequently, the bulk of the additional proactive resources provided should be allocated to patrol staff who will report, through their sergeants, to the area lieutenants. The area lieutenants will then be responsible for ensuring the resources are deployed in the most effective manner possible. The number of additional officers that should report to the area lieutenants in each division, after taking into account expected absences, is summarized in the following table.

Division	Additional FTEs Needed To Support Proactive Initiatives	Additional Positions Needed After Considering Relief(a)
Southeast	50.72	63
Southwest	27.95	35
Central	32.13	40
North Central	21.28	27
Northwest	32.91	41
Northeast	42.99	54
Total	207.98	260

(a) A relief factor of 1.25 was used to calculate total additional staffing needs.

A different approach should be taken to allocating the proactive resources provided to reflect the fact that patrol officers will be less productive in supporting proactive initiatives than dedicated staff. The primary reason to provide these additional resources is to support efforts to reduce crime. Therefore, it makes sense to allocate these resources in a manner that reflects the level of crime in each patrol division that can be affected by police activity. The following table summarizes the number of “repressible crimes” that took place in each patrol division in 2003.³²

Division	Repressible Crimes	Percent Of Total
Southeast	19,326	18.2%
Southwest	20,487	19.3%
Central	14,096	13.3%
North Central	13,658	12.9%
Northwest	16,398	15.5%
Northeast	22,013	20.8%
Total	105,978	100.0%

The number of staff that should be allocated to each patrol division based on the level of “repressible crimes” in each division and after taking into account expected absences follows.

³² Repressible crime are crimes such as burglary, robbery and auto theft that can reasonably be affected by police activity. Other crimes such as murder, rape and aggravated assault are difficult to address through the implementation of proactive policing tactics.

Division	Allocation Percentage	Total Discretionary Staff To Be Allocated	Staff Allocated To Division	Allocation After Relief (a)
Southeast	18.2%	61.2	11.1	14
Southwest	19.3%	61.2	11.8	15
Central	13.3%	61.2	8.1	10
North Central	12.9%	61.2	7.9	10
Northwest	15.5%	61.2	9.5	12
Northeast	20.8%	61.2	12.7	16
Total	100.0%		61.2	77

(a) A relief factor of 1.25 was used to calculate total staffing needs.

Each division's deputy chief should determine how best to deploy these proactive resources to reduce crime and improve services in a manner consistent with the division's goals and objectives.

Supervisory And Management Requirements

This section discusses the number of patrol lieutenants and patrol sergeants that are needed to support area service operations.

Area lieutenants. If area lieutenants are to effectively fulfill the role outlined for them in this chapter the areas for which they are responsible must be small enough that they can effectively tailor services (consistent with division and department objectives) to community needs. In addition, to the extent possible, the level of activity in each area supervised by a lieutenant should be roughly the same. The following table presents recommendations for the number of area lieutenants that should be assigned to each division and the number of calls-for-service each area receives per year.

Division	Annual Calls Received	Recommended Sector Lieutenants	Annual Calls Received Per Area
Central	113,610	3	37,870.0
Northeast	145,273	4	36,318.3
Southeast	170,089	5	34,017.8
Southwest	154,528	4	38,632.0
Northwest	113,661	3	37,887.0
North Central	92,205	3	30,735.0

Please note that if each lieutenant is to oversee activities in a discrete number of sectors the configuration of existing sectors will need to be modified to even out workload among the area lieutenants.

Sergeants. Typically, a ratio of one sergeant for every eight to ten patrol officers, senior corporals and public safety officers is sufficient to provide adequate supervision in a police department. As discussed in Chapter IX, however, strengthening supervision will be of crucial importance to the department's efforts to improve performance. Consequently, providing supervisory capacity at the lower end of the range of one sergeant for every eight to ten subordinates is recommended where practical. The number of sergeants that are needed to oversee patrol activities in each patrol division and on each watch is summarized in Exhibit XIV-9.

SPECIALIZED SERVICES

This section discusses the staffing needs for the two specialized services that will be decentralized to the patrol division: investigations and response to injury accidents. As discussed previously in this chapter, a lieutenant will oversee the overall specialized services unit.

Investigations

This discussion presents an approach to determining the number of investigators and investigative supervisors that should be assigned to each patrol division.

Investigators. Staffing of the investigations units assigned to the patrol divisions should be modified as the recommendation to assign responsibility for investigating a greater variety of cases to the patrol divisions is implemented. (The information on current caseloads was insufficient to perform this analysis as part of this engagement.) However, when making these staffing allocations care should be taken to ensure the same expectations for investigator productivity is reflected in the staffing of each division. As the following table shows, the investigators assigned to some divisions are currently somewhat more productive than the investigators assigned to other units.

	Cases Assigned	Investigators	Cases Per Investigators
Central	6,982	11(a)	634.7
Northeast	11,374	17	669.1
Southeast	9,861	17	580.1
Southwest	10,717	18	595.4
Northwest	7,314	15	487.6
North Central	7,205	13	554.2

(a) Although 15 investigators are assigned to the Central Operations Division one is a desk officer and four inspect salvage yards throughout the city.

As a rule, staffing levels should be based on the average productivity of the two divisions with the highest level of investigative productivity.

Sergeants. Typically, investigative supervisors can effectively oversee the investigative work of 8 to 10 investigators. Consequently, two investigative sergeants should be assigned to the investigative units at each of the patrol divisions. However, in the North Central Patrol Operations Division where the span of control for these sergeants will be low they should be expected to spend a portion of their time handling an investigative caseload.

Clerical support. As previously discussed, two civilian support staff should be assigned to each patrol operations division to provide clerical support and to assign cases.

Response To Injury Accidents

As discussed in Chapter VII, responsibility for selective traffic enforcement and response to injury accidents should be reassigned from the central traffic unit to the patrol division. Currently 72 patrol officers and senior corporals are assigned to the traffic unit who respond to accidents and focus on traffic enforcement. These patrol officers and senior corporals are managed by 10 sergeants. These officers and sergeants should be

reassigned to the patrol divisions based on the number of injury accidents in each division. The following table summarizes the number of traffic officers and sergeants that should be assigned to each division.

Division	Injury Accidents	Percent Of Injury Accidents	Allocation Of Traffic Unit Officers	Allocation Of Traffic Unit Sergeants
Southeast	4,249	17.1%	12	2
Southwest	4,802	19.3%	14	2
Central	3,357	13.5%	10	1
North Central	3,646	14.7%	10	1
Northwest	4,471	18.0%	13	2
Northeast	4,311	17.4%	13	2
Total	24,836		72	10

Sergeants who have a narrow span of control should be expected to devote part of their shifts to selective traffic enforcement and accident response activities.

PLANNING, BUDGET AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Since one of the key roles of the recommended planning, budget and accountability unit is to provide technical assistance and support to area lieutenants in developing and implementing tactical plans it is important that the unit be managed by a lieutenant. In addition, two or three civilian analysts should be assigned to the division depending on the number of area lieutenants being supported. The number of analysts needed, which is summarized in the following table, assumes that each division will need a .5 FTE analyst to support budget and grant related activities and that analysts should devote roughly two days per week to supporting the work of each area lieutenant. Based on this formula, the Southeast Operations Division is the only division with a need for three civilian analysts.

Division	Recommended Area Lieutenants	Fixed Staffing Requirement	Variable Staffing Requirement	Total	Staffing After Rounding
Central	3.0	0.5	1.2	1.7	2.0
Northeast	4.0	0.5	1.6	2.1	2.0
Southeast	5.0	0.5	2.0	2.5	3.0
Southwest	4.0	0.5	1.6	2.1	2.0
Northwest	3.0	0.5	1.2	1.7	2.0
North Central	3.0	0.5	1.2	1.7	2.0

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

The administrative services unit should be responsible for coordinating administrative activities for the entire division. The administrative sergeant who leads the unit should supervise on a day-to-day basis two clerical support staff and two police officer or senior corporal positions who support the deputy chief's community outreach efforts. In addition, one administrative assistant position should be established to provide administrative support on each of the three primary patrol watches and two public safety

officer positions should be assigned to each patrol shift to serve as station officer.³³ In addition to serving as station officer,³⁴ these PSOs should also provide administrative support for field training officers.

SUMMARY

Implementing These Recommendations Will Result In A Substantial Increase In The Staffing Of The Patrol Divisions

Implementing these recommendations will result in an increase of 340 positions in the Patrol Bureau.³⁵

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	6	6	0
Lieutenant	30	34	4
Sergeant	182	232	50
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	1627	1786	159
Total Sworn	1845	2058	213
PSO	16	115	99
Other Non Sworn	45	73	28
Total Nonsworn	61	188	127
Total	1906	2246	340

The staffing implications by division are presented in the following sections.

Southeast Operations Division. Staffing of the Southeast Operations Division will increase by 45 positions.

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	1	1	0
Lieutenant	4	7	3
Sergeant	38	50	12
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	377	385	8
Total Sworn	420	443	23
PSO	2	20	18
Other Non Sworn	9	13	4
Total Nonsworn	11	33	22
Total	431	476	45

³³ Two public safety officer positions per shift is sufficient to ensure that one PSO is working 365 days a year after taking into account regularly scheduled days off and excused absences.

³⁴ If a citizen comes to the police station and needs the assistance of a sworn officer the PSO should call a police officer from elsewhere in the station or from the street.

³⁵ Officers deployed to support the Walker consent decree as well as officers on special assignments are included in the current numbers for each patrol division.

Southwest Operations Division. Staffing of the Southwest Operation Division will increase by 69 positions.

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	1	1	0
Lieutenant	4	6	2
Sergeant	28	42	14
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	294	325	31
Total Sworn	327	374	47
PSO	3	22	19
Other Non Sworn	9	12	3
Total Nonsworn	12	34	22
Total	339	408	69

Central Operations Division. Staffing of the Central Operations Division will increase by 90 positions.

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	1	1	0
Lieutenant	6	6	0
Sergeant	36	41	5
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	254	325	71
Total Sworn	297	373	76
PSO	3	17	14
Other Non Sworn	12	12	0
Total Nonsworn	15	29	14
Total	312	402	90

North Central Operations Division. Staffing of the North Central Operations Division will increase by 50 positions.

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	1	1	0
Lieutenant	5	5	0
Sergeant	26	26	0
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	170	196	26
Total Sworn	202	228	26
PSO	1	15	14
Other Non Sworn	2	12	10
Total Nonsworn	3	27	24
Total	205	255	50

Northwest Operations Division. Staffing of the Northwest Operations Division will increase by 30 positions.

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	1	1	0
Lieutenant	5	5	0
Sergeant	27	31	4
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	241	244	3
Total Sworn	274	281	7
PSO	2	21	19
Other Non Sworn	8	12	4
Total Nonsworn	10	33	23
Total	284	314	30

Northeast Operations Division. Staffing of the Northeast Operations Division will increase by 56 positions.

Position	Current	Recommended	Increase
Deputy Chief	1	1	0
Lieutenant	6	5	(1)
Sergeant	27	42	15
Police Officer And Senior Corporal	291	311	20
Total Sworn	325	359	34
PSO	5	20	15
Other Non Sworn	5	12	7
Total Nonsworn	10	32	22
Total	335	391	56

Additional Patrol Vehicles Will Be Needed To Implement The Staffing Recommendations

To implement the staffing and deployment recommendations (especially the recommendation that patrol officers be deployed in one-officer elements) additional vehicles will need to be assigned to the patrol division. The following table summarizes vehicle staffing needs at each patrol division (excluding staff from centralized units reassigned to support patrol operations). The recommended number of vehicles assumes that a pool of 15 percent of the total vehicles needed will need to be provided to replace vehicles while they are being replaced or maintained.

	Current Vehicles	Vehicles Needed	Additional Vehicles Required
Southeast	176	193	17
Southwest	119	168	49
Central	106	126	20
North Central	72	87	15
Northwest	90	113	23
Northeast	96	162	66
Total			190